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A New Look at the Three World Classification*
D u d le y  Seers
A ‘Three  world ' classification of nations has been 
in use for the third quarter of this century in two 
distinct respects. First, the structures of in ter­
national organizations, (e.g. the committees of 
U N C T A D 1) have been based on the three classes 
of ‘centrally p lanned’, ‘developed’ and ‘less 
developed’ or ‘developing’ countries, in the 
odiously euphemistic language of the United 
N ations (the last group has also been know n as 
the ‘Third  W orld ’). Secondly, this classification 
has helped to shape the way in which we perceive 
and interpret international events.
I am going to look briefly at the basis and impli­
cations of this division, then at the way in which 
it has been eroded by political and economic 
trends in the last two decades, and  conclude by 
suggesting a classification which looks more 
appropria te  for the remainder of the century, with 
some notes on its implications for national policy. 
* * * *
The conventional classification has rested on two 
cri teria— whether a country is or is no t ‘C o m ­
munist’, and secondly on its level of income (and 
industrialisation). As a system its acceptability  has 
depended partly on the fact that it is convenient 
to the parties concerned. G overnm ents  of 
‘developing’ countr ies use it as a means of pressure 
on the ‘developed’ to obtain comm itments such as 
the generalisation of preferences and aid targets, 
etc. It is also convenient to the C om m unist  bloc 
that the main division encouraged the form er 
colonies to address their demands to the form er 
metropolitan countries. While the governm ent of 
‘developed' countries found these dem ands irk ­
some, they accepted, fo r various reasons, tha t  they 
did have some interest in helping the ‘developing’ 
countries to become ‘developed’, in the foreseeable 
future, w ithout passing through a Com m unist  
phase.
This international classification was consistent 
with the H arro d -D o m ar  national growth model. 
It implied tha t a ‘developing’ country  could, by 
planning to raise its per capita  national income, 
achieve a more prestigious place in the world
* Based on seminars given at the Universities of Harvard and 
Puerto Rico, and a contribution to a consultative meeting of the 
U nited Nations University in Tokyo.
1 There are in fact four country committees in U N C T A D , 
since separate ones operate for Latin America and the 
Afro-Asia group. However, for many purposes these last meet 
jointly.
order and greater economic independence. It led 
to the Third  World dem ands for capital,  in 
U N C T A D  I, II and III,  which was believed to be 
a necessary, even almost sufficient, condition for 
achieving this growth.
A com m on belief in the 1950s was tha t shelves 
were full of the necessary technologies and the 
Third  W orld  could simply help themselves. The 
‘developed’ countries had solved their economic 
and social problems and those of the T hird  World 
could do the same if they followed in the former 's  
footsteps. T heir  task was easier than  tha t  of 
countries which were industrialising in the 19th 
century. If  they invested enough  and  still did not 
grow, this must be due to ‘obstacles’— religions, 
tradit ional customs, family systems, linguistic 
barriers, excessive fertility, etc., etc., which 
hindered the operation of the various fac tor and 
product markets.
The strategy for ‘developing’ countries, expressed 
in ‘developm ent’ plans, and D evelopm ent Decade 
documents, was therefore to grow by modern isa­
tion. Before long, hopefully, a m odern  s tandard 
of living would be within everyone’s reach. The 
task of in ternational organizations such as 
U N C T A D  was primarily  to arrange the transfer 
of resources to facili tate this; it was expressed in 
targets fo r growth rates and fo r  transfers of aid 
and private capital,  and resolutions ab ou t  tariff 
preferences, com m odity  prices, etc. T h e  delega­
tions of ‘developed' countries usually supported 
these resolutions reluctantly and with little 
in tention of implementation.
The collapse o f the model
In suggesting how this set of ideas, which 
am ounted  to a model of world development, was 
underm ined, I have to generalise even m ore  wildly. 
Perhaps the most significant developm ent was that 
countries with sustained fast economic growth, as 
high as 3-4 per cent in per capita  terms, did not by 
any means experience reductions in unem ploy­
ment, inequality o r poverty. N o r  did they become 
economically m ore  independent.
Im port  substituting industrialization tu rned  out to 
reinforce im ported  styles of consum ption enjoyed 
by small minorities and to create new sorts of 
dependence on capital,  technology and  inter­
mediate products from abroad. It also usually led 
to some neglect of the agricultural sector and 
therefore  dependence on im ported  foodstuffs,
especially wheat; m any  countries which had been 
traditionally cereal exporters became importers.
While these economic trends were undermining 
the growth-centered ideological coun te rpart  of the 
three-world system, it was also being made 
obsolete by other developments: first, a degree of 
‘convergence’ between the com m unis t and n o n ­
comm unist worlds with some of the form er 
(such as H ungary) relying much more on 
market forces, while state in tervention and 
nationalisation has spread in the latter. In any 
case China and  one or two other C om m unist 
countries had broken their political alignment 
with the Soviet U nion  and increasingly diverged 
in political behaviour.
There has also been a growing fuzziness in the 
boundary  between the ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ 
countries. Western Europe has been developing 
into a ‘developing a rea ’, showing characteristic 
chronic paym ent difficulties, chronic unem ploy­
ment and chronic inflation. M ore  to the point, 
Western E urope has itself increasingly been 
importing technology and  capital via transnational 
companies. T h e  impact o f the word ‘developed’ 
and its power to inspire emulation was weakened 
by none of the ‘developed’ any longer seeing 
themselves as paradigms. N o r  do they have much 
capital to spare after meeting the politically press­
ing dem ands of their own populations for ever 
higher consum ption levels.
This model of world development was further 
weakened by the com bined oil and  food crises of 
the last three years. In the first place, this exposed 
the vulnerability of g row th strategies based on 
highly-mechanised industrialisation. Secondly, it 
showed that there were o ther ways of obtaining 
resources than  waiting fo r  the ‘developed’ 
countries to provide capital. Thirdly, it cast a 
considerable question m ark  against the possibility 
of the whole world population  reaching a modern 
s tandard within the next couple of generations or 
indeed ever. T he  world suddenly became a much 
less benign place.
The question also now rises: how does one classify 
Kuwait, which has the highest per capita  income 
in the world? If  we describe K uwait as more 
‘developed’ than the U nited  States this intuitively 
seems absurd. Although it exports a great deal of 
one saleable comm odity , it is also weak in several 
im portant respects. Its citizens are accustomed to 
extremely com fortab le  consum ption standards but 
it has to im port a lmost everything. K uwait is a 
town in the desert and produces practically no 
food except vegetables. It has to im port technology 
for all sectors, even the petro leum industry. It has 
nationalized the physical assets of the petroleum
companies but it canno t nationalize their main 
assets, production technology and access to world 
markets. It is still dependent on the flow of 
expertise from abroad, even to extract its main 
economic asset, oil. And it is also a country  with 
too small a population to defend itself (and the 
G ulf  is a politically unstable area). It also lacks 
national unity: about half  the resident population 
are migrants from  Palestine, India, Iran, Iraq, etc., 
who have taken jobs which could not be filled by 
citizens.
The dimensions of dependence
A country  is economically dependent on the rest 
of the world to the degree tha t its production  
structure does not match its consum ption struc­
ture. It is a m atter o f consum ption styles as well 
as whether the country  concerned can produce 
locally the necessary inputs to sustain them.
T o  assess the nature  and degree of a coun try ’s 
dependence, simulate a situation in which it is cut 
off from the outside world and therefore  from  its 
no rm al sources of supply of oil, food and tech­
nology and ask w hat the consequences would be 
of being cut off from  them and  how tolerable 
these would be. It is not necessary fo r  this to 
happen or even for it to be a real possibility. The 
potential consequences of autarchic  policies put a 
brake  on its freedom of action. (In a primitive 
community, such as a mining camp, a m an 's  
relative physical strength does not have to be 
tested in a fight fo r him to dom ina te  o ther males.) 
There  are m any  economic inputs which it would 
be painful to do w ithout— metal ores, textile fibres, 
etc. But clearly the most im portan t are energy and 
food, which means basically petroleum and 
cereals.
Dependence is not only an economic concept. 
Clearly the power a governm ent exercises depends 
also on the military force at its disposal. This too 
is related to technology and  especially the capacity 
to produce its own weapons.
It is also related to population  size, because this 
affects the numbers in the arm ed forces, and (more 
im portant and m ore  directly) the num bers  avail­
able to be mobilised in time of war. Size of 
population is also relevant in other ways. A t a 
given level of income, it determines the size of the 
market, which is in tu rn  clearly related to the 
s tructure of production, especially the size o f the 
sector producing capital equipment. It also affects 
the n um ber of research and development staff. 
This in turn  determines the level of technology 
and the capacity to select im ported techniques 
appropria te  to national needs.2
2 Of course to say that a large population is an asset to a 
country is not to imply that population growth strengthens it.
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A country 's  size can also measured in terms of 
area. This may also be an asset. A large country 
is (as Russia has often shown) more capable of 
absorbing and defeating invading armies. Since 
oil and o ther natural resources are scattered more 
or less random ly, the larger a country is (including 
its territorial waters) the more likely it is to have 
petroleum and metals, and also areas suitable for 
growing cereals (though much, of course, depends 
on climate, soil and technique as well). However it 
is not necessarily helpful to a country  to have a 
large area, even a large arable area, if they have 
to support a large population (India being the 
classic case). Still for a large population to have a 
limited arable area (as Japan  has) is a definite 
weakness.
A nother  type of dependence is political— military 
alliances, political organisations, etc. A nother 
again is cultu ra l— im porting magazines, TV p ro ­
grammes, news agency material,  etc., adapting 
foreign fashions in everything from religions to 
economic models,  languages and styles of c loth­
ing.3 Political and cultural au tonom y depend on 
the degree of politico-cultural unity, reflecting 
class differences and also ethnic and linguistic 
heterogeneity, which have their roots in national 
history, especially in the colonial period, when 
settlers and immigrant labour often arrived.4 The 
key question here is the extent to which a govern­
ment can appeal successfully to patriotism to 
justify sacrifices.
If I only list these influences it is not because they 
are unim portant,  but because I want to propose a 
manageable system of classification of countries 
in a limited space. I could, however, go a step 
fur ther  and suggest that while political and 
(especially) cultural determinants of a govern­
m en t’s room  to manoeuvre, are im portant,  there 
is a greater long-term reality to a coun try ’s 
population and resource base.
A dependency classification
The table indicates fo r a num ber of countries the 
degree of self-sufficiency in technology, cereals, 
and oil. The fourth column shows size of p opu la ­
tion.5 Certain features stand out from the table. In 
the first place, the United States, the Soviet U nion 
and China, having large populations, are 
militarily far  more powerful than  other countries
3 Another factor determining in some degree political and 
cultural dependence is location, especially in relation to 
countries which are more powerful in these respects.
4 Countries with large populations are usually far from 
homogeneous. However in a very large country, the very 
diversity of ethnic and linguistic groups may be a source of 
strength, provided no single one is partially dominant. Ethnic 
differences may be more important in small bi-racial countries 
such as Malaysia and Singapore.
5 Area is not shown; population is a proxy for it (though a 
weak one).
and none of them entirely lack any of the three 
key resources. They are each net importers of just 
one of them — this is true only  of these countries. 
They would be the best able to withstand a b reak­
down of trade with the rest of the world (as 
indeed they have in various ways demonstrated).
The Assets and Liabilities o f Various Countries
T echnology Cereals Oil Size
USA * + * *** * ***
Soviet Union ** * *** ***
China * ** * * * 2
Japan * * * 0 ***
West G erm any ** * 0 **
East G erm any ** * 0 **
Kuwait 0 0 *** 0
Iran 0 * * ** **
Brazil * * * ***
Cuba * * 0 ***
Costa  Rica 0 * 0 *
1 Apparently turning into an export surplus.
2 Considerably larger than the others (c. 700 m.)
First three colum ns  (resources)
*** N et exporter 
** Approximately self-sufficient
* N et importer
O Virtually zero capacity.
Fourth  co lum n  (popula tion )
*** >  100 m .
** 10 - 100 m.
* 1 -  10 m .
O <  1 m.
It would, however, be wrong to call them ‘indepen­
den t’. Although they each have only one weakness, 
it is serious. F o r  the United States, it is oil (which 
might in the long-term be overcome by the 
development of shale coal and nuclear energy): 
the US is also a net im porter  of iron ore and 
o ther im portan t metals. Cereals are the Achilles 
heel of the Soviet Union (and to cure this would 
apparently  require a big and difficult reorganisa­
tion of the rural economy). The Chinese deficiency 
is in technology including nuclear arms: this can 
be made up m ore  easily, suggesting their possible 
emergence as the most independent country  in a 
few decades, especially since consum er aspirations 
can presumably be more effectively restrained in 
China  than  elsewhere, certainly than in the United 
States.
All three would find autarchy  uncomfortable. 
M oreover they are dependent in o ther senses; 
their military security requires neighbours which 
are at least neutral.  Some countries are currently 
termed the ‘least developed’ : let us call these 
three the ‘least dependent’, to reflect their partial 
but limited dependence.
Japan  is often counted as a ‘super pow er’ and 
certainly its per capita income is far  higher than 
that of China. It has a big population and exports
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technology (and thus capital equ ipm ent6) as well 
as importing it. It has ano ther  great asset, which 
does not appear  on the table: a population more 
homogeneous, ethnically and linguistically, than 
that of almost any other country. Its social class 
differences are severe and (unlike the three ‘least 
dependent’ countries) a general strike against the 
government within the next few years is not u n ­
thinkable. But a com m on culture is deeply rooted 
in Japanese history and it could be argued that in 
a politico-economic crisis its population would 
show considerable cohesion. Still, if Japan  were 
cut off from the outside world it would crash to 
destruction: imported oil is needed to enable the 
population to keep warm, to comm unicate ,  to 
move from one place to ano ther  (even to open 
doors of buildings and raise people to their ap a r t ­
ments) and to produce and  distribute other 
necessities. Life styles would have to be drastically 
changed if food imports were eliminated.
The structural pattern of West G erm any  is s tr ik­
ingly similar, and with a few variations this could 
be broadly taken as representative of the countries 
of Western E urope too.7 They buy technology 
(and also arms and equipment) from multinational 
corporations based in the United States, but also 
export these to o ther West European  countries 
and the rest of the world, via multinational private 
or state corpora tions based in Western Europe. 
They are mostly partially dependent on imported 
cereals, and highly dependent on imported oil.8 
To call them a separate g roup does not imply that 
they will always co-operate  in policy matters. 
They do indeed have a collective interest in exert­
ing their combined bargaining power, vis-a-vis 
the United States, oil exporters, etc. But, as 
always, situations may develop which tempt 
individual members of cartels to break away and 
negotiate bilateral contracts .9
This approach  to international analysis seems 
more useful than  the conventional one in explain­
ing the growing divergence of behaviour am ong 
the governments of ‘developed’ countr ies, between 
the United States and the others. The  latter are 
hardly even consulted any more on m ajor  US 
initiatives.10 T he  emergence of a sellers’ m arket in
6 Because of restrictions imposed after the war, Japan is not 
a manufacturer of majcr military equipment such as war­
planes.
7 West Germany in one respect is not typical— it is highly
dependent on immigrant workers.
8 E.E.C. would depend heavily on oil if it were a single
country. Of course it would have a large total population, but 
could not be considered as in the same ‘least dependent’ 
class as the U S A , the Soviet U ni n or China.
9 This is especially likely to be true of Britain and Norway
because of their potential export capacity in oil.
10 It is true that there has also b;en  an additional reason, the
greater weight of pro-Israel political lobbies in the United
States than elsewhere, but this hardly appears sufficient to
justify the go-it-alone policy of the U S  government.
cereals, and the increasing importance of tech­
nology, especially in the extraction of oil and 
metals (including exploration offshore and by 
satellite), means that United States interests differ 
more profoundly  from those of Western Europe 
than previously, and  that its bargaining strength 
is much greater.  T he  US governm ent is clearly 
determined to open new channels of negotiation 
outside U N C T A D , to weaken O P E C  and to reach 
an arm s agreement with the Soviet Union.
F or  some purposes it seems better to consider 
Japan  and the countries of Western Europe as a 
separate class, which one might call ‘semi­
dependent’. They are not unanim ous in defending 
multinational corpora tions when these are under 
attack at U N C T A D  (since they too are often 
subject to heavy economic and political pressures 
from US corporations) and they also have less 
bargaining strength vis-a-vis countries exporting 
primary  products.
Analogous developments have occurred among 
‘C om m unis t’ countries. Differences between 
resource patterns in Eastern E uropean  countries 
on the one hand  and in the Soviet Union on the 
other have become increasingly im portant.  So for 
many purposes it may be more useful to class the 
la tter as ‘sem i-dependent’ too. A part  f rom  the 
convergence in forms of economic organisation, 
there is therefore an additional reason to suspect 
a growing com m onality  of interest between 
Western and Eastern Europe.
A nother  class of countries are also ‘semi-depen­
den t’, but in a different sense— the petroleum 
exporters. T he  bigger members o f O PEC , like 
Iran, differ f rom  the smaller ones, such as Kuwait, 
in several im portan t respects, notably the existence 
of an agricultural hinterland and a much larger 
population base. But they also all have much in 
comm on. In complete contrast to Europe, they 
have oil to trade for technology, arms and equip­
ment, and for m anufac tu red  imports to meet very 
high consum er expectations. While the exportable 
surplus of oil is only tem porary , from an historical 
perspective, for several decades many of them will 
have interests different from  those of other groups, 
including the rest of the ‘T hird  W orld ’.11
I have shown only a few n o n -O P E C  ‘developing’ 
countries in the table. N early  all countries in 
Africa, Asia and Latin A merica depend on im­
ported cereals and oil, and on imported tech­
nology. T o  buy these, they offer less essential 
commodities such as coffee, tea, bananas, cocoa.
11 In 1974, they were portrayed by some as almost another 
world power (eg. in the doctrine of ‘polycentricity’). H ow ­
ever, the very euphoria cf that time has led to such l 
massive waste of resources that it is no longer even con­
ceivable to depict them in this way.
11
sugar and cotton. (Some also have tourist facili­
ties.) They can therefore truly be termed 
‘dependent’ countries.  This dependence is m an i­
fested in a basically passive attitude to foreign 
investment.12
Since they also share with O P E C  members a 
chronic  reliance on imported technology, equ ip­
ment and arms, there is an economic rationale  in 
the continuance of the ‘Third  W orld ’ as an entity, 
in support o f  the New International Economic 
O rder .13 This has been reinforced by the use of 
part o f  oil revenue as aid. The political basis is a 
persisting determination to revenge humiliations 
suffered in the colonial period and to achieve 
respectable world status.
The communist-capitalist split also continues to 
have organisational and ideological reality,14 so 
the T h re e  W orld’ classification still has some life 
left But one must expect an acceleration in the 
fragmentation  of the three worlds and the g row ­
ing im portance of geographical and social factors. 
This will become more evident when the recession 
is succeeded by a new phase of rapid expansion, 
raising world income well above the 1973/4 peak 
and revealing crucial supply difficulties again. 
Indeed another  world cereal shortage has 
apparently  emerged already, before the recession 
is over. In the 1980s and 90s, population pressure 
will allow little relief from  resource problems.
Policies for a less benign world
Finally, a few words on the national development 
policies that would be compatible  with this 
approach. First, there are no fundam enta l  differ­
ences in the strategies appropria te  to the govern­
ments of ‘centrally p lanned’, ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ countries.  T he  crucial task for every 
governm ent is to develop technical expertise and 
to control consum er aspirations. F o r  all of them, 
though in different ways, w hat were thought of as 
‘obstacles'  to development when this was synony­
mous with economic growth —  nationalism, 
separate languages, traditional customs, etc.—
12 Typically the capital of a dependent country is beseiged by 
visiting business men with investment projects.
13 The N IE O  is however ambivalent, as perhaps is to be 
expected in a period of rapid transition. On the one hand 
it stresses the rights to national ownership of natural re­
sources and to form sellers’ cartels; on the other, it is still 
concerned with the continuation of inflows of capital and 
technology. One might put it that underlying a cry of “rape” 
is a low murmur: “ But for G od’s sake don’t stop yet” .
14 T he dependence of many governments is not a general 
dependence on the outside world as a whole, but specifi­
cally towards one or two others, usually United States or 
the Soviet Union. An ideological division has been rein­
forced by links in trade and also culture. In fact the 
ideological distinction is becoming of decreasing relevance. 
If the Soviet Union were to become capitalist (or, for that
matter, the United States experienced a communist revolu­
tion) it would not make a great deal of difference to the 
world structure: all governments must use their bargaining 
power as best they can to protect the consumption standards 
of their own populations.
appear rather as shields against modern  consum p­
tion styles and technologies which canno t be 
afforded by more than a minority  of the popu la ­
tions, and which increase dependence. Outside the 
‘least developed’ countries, the universal need is 
for sufficient technical and adminis trative capacity 
to screen the im portation  of production and con­
sumption techniques, and m onito r  those which 
have been allowed into the country.
It follows tha t  a planning office should no longer 
be primarily  concerned with growth targets or 
with projects, but with creating the cadres capable 
of evolving and implementing a development 
strategy expressed in targets fo r key resources and 
styles of consumption. Its second priority would 
be building up  the in form ation  needed to back 
such a strategy, especially in negotiations with 
foreign firms and governm ents— inform ation  on 
the range of technologies available internationally, 
on the cost of different ways of obtaining them, 
etc.
In order to support these strategies, a develop­
ment plan will also need to devote substantial 
resources to reinforcing nationalism —  e.g., 
s trengthening national and religious organisations; 
preserving and developing shrines and monum ents ,  
supporting tradit ional crafts, etc. A no ther  require­
ment is adequate  arm ed forces and a development 
plan needs to indicate their optimal size in relation 
to other safeguards of independence.
Measures to check the waste of key resources 
would in themselves do something to check social 
polarization. But in addition, m any  governments 
may well need more purposive policies to elimin­
ate inequalit ies based on social classes, race or 
region, and acute poverty, if they are to achieve 
the national unity necessary to back national 
policies in technology and resource exploitation.15 
This points to the need, on these grounds alone, 
for policies of redistributing property  and income. 
Lowering the concentration  of income would 
reduce dem and for imported technology and oil 
( though possibly raising the dem and for imported 
cereals).
G overnm ents  which lack the political basis for 
this may well face serious crises.16 It also points to 
the need for technology policies tha t  reconcile the 
objectives of spreading em ploym ent and income 
with the fast development of key sectors.
There  are implications fo r  aid lobbies in the less 
dependent countries. In a world of slower
13 T his is already the guiding philosophy of the development 
plans of Malaysia. Of course, in some synthetic countries, the 
region may be, especially for its inhabitants, the natural focus 
of loyalty and planning.
16 This reinforces in fact the need for introducing distributive 
targets, already felt in 1960s because of the social distortions 
of purely growth-oriented strategies.
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economic growth there is less prospect than ever 
of liberal internationalism, based on feelings of 
guilt, being an elfective force in the redistr ibution 
of world income. T he  prim ary function of lobby­
ing governm ents before, e.g., U N C T A D  is no 
longer an endless and essentially vain battle to 
shift a little more resources so as to raise 
marginally the growth rate of ‘developing’ 
countries. It is to stimulate delegations to find 
ways of reconciling the needs of countries with 
various resource patterns, so tha t international
strategies and initiatives can be developed in key 
fields, especially energy and food.
In brief, recent developments have undermined the 
belief in an essentially benign world, in which 
nationalism was seen as an archaic but d isappear­
ing impediment to m odernization and social 
change. It is now m ore  obvious than ever tha t no 
‘international o rde r’ will survive unless it is based 
on an acceptance of realities, namely the basic 
interests of countries o f all types.
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